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During the 1990s post communist societies faced similar challenges at 
the level of executive government. Since the early studies of Rosenthal 
(1978), political science literature’s focus is on the different continuums of 
political stability. The literature argued that “political stability, political order 
and political structure belong to a single category of political concepts. One 
may call it the category of time oriented political concepts. Political stability 
indicates that a political phenomenon (unit of analysis) has stood unaltered 
throughout a period of time”1 (italics added).  
From an empirical standpoint, Jose Casanova argued “the greatest 
threats to political stability are likely to result from excessive 
democratization, that is, from internal cleavages, hyper-mobilization, the 
overload of social and political demands, and the ensuing crisis of 
governability of paralysis of centralized, unified command”2 (italics added). 
In recent years there has been an increased interest in analyzing the 
effects of political instability in post communist Romania. The cabinet 
structure, the period of governance, the reasons of termination of a 
government represented persistent variations over the period examined. 
However, in spite of the mounting interest, a close look at the socio-political 
situation of Romania suggests the vulnerable notion of political instability.  
This article is an effort to look at the indicators of political instability 
(redefined as Government instability) in an unconsolidated democracy. The 
issue of political stability in post-communist Romania must of course be 
analyzed in relation to the challenges of reform and the sources of the limited 
consensus in government coalition in Romania (1992-2004). The 
methodology of the study concerns with the dynamics underlying political 
instability in any post communist society but with the determinants within all 
national political systems3. Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane introduced new 
concepts of political stability that are suitable for the description of the cross-
                                               
1 Uriel Rosenthal, Political Order: Rewards, Punishments and Political Stability, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978, p. 48. 
2 Jose Casanova, Ethno-Linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in 
Ukraine in Barnett R. Rubin, Jack L. Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State 
Building, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 84. 
3 James Chowning Davies, James Davies, When Men Revolt and why, New Jersey, 
Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 231. 
sectional and longitudinal variation in basic aspects of the political systems of 
Western Europe. The analyzis of standard indicators on political instability 
applied to European data revealed six properties: public sector deficit, 
inflation, government change, party system volatility, violence and protest4.  
Citron and Nickelsburg (1987) propose a different model for the study 
of political instability. The model of country risk incorporates economic and 
political variables referring to a standard equation; the political instability 
indicator is proxied by the number of changes of government over a five 
years (the study showed that when a governemnt is characterized by 
instability, ”the increase in government welfare through spending depends 
essentially from domestic purchases”5.  
In order to test the government instability in the period 1990-2004, we 
introduce two standard indicators of the institutional stability that can explain 
changes in government coalition:  
a. the duration of a government; 
b. the optimal report among the cabinets of the mentioned period6. 
We adopt this focus as it provides the most significant insights 
into the issue of political stability, of how and why governments 
succeed. 
 
 
I. Government Organization 1992-2004 
 
Yet, although the process of institutional building is still very much 
unfinished, the foundation established in the last 18 years represents the basic 
direction taken seems to be one conductive to a political instability. 
The period 1990-1996 covers the first period of government by the 
left of centre National Salvation Front (NSF) and its successor, the Party of 
Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR)7. However, Roman’s successors, 
Theodor Stolojan and Nicolae Văcăroiu, vary from public hostility to radical, 
                                               
4 See Svante Ersson, Jan-Erik Lane, Political Stability in European Democracies in 
“European Journal of Political Research”, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp. 245-264. 
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both pursued gradualist reforms involving the phased removal of price 
control, an ineffective system of privatization and insignificant structural 
reforms.  
András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama argued that while it is often 
taken for granted that the structure of government is reflected in the structure 
of the economy8. In the case of Romania, resistance to reform in the first 
years after the failure of the communist regime not only raised questions 
about the economic reform, but about the profound implications for the 
democratic institutions. 
In 1996, Romania voted out of office President Ion Iliescu and elected 
in his place Emil Constantinescu who represented the Romanian Democratic 
Convention (CDR), the largest coalition of opposition parties9. The 
Convention’s first Prime Minister was Victor Ciorbea. The government was a 
coalition between CDR, the USD and the UDMR (themselves coalitions)10. 
From the beginning it has to be acknowledged that this heterogeneous 
coalition was made of political actors with different memories, histories and 
different political convictions.  
Under these circumstances in December 2000 the ex-communists 
returned to power (the Social Democratic Alliance in coalition with the 
Romanian Social Democratic Party and won 37% of the seats in Parliament). 
The most striking change between the two elections was the collapse of the 
center-right Democratic Convention (CDR), which had been the centerpiece 
of the post-1996 governing coalition11. The new administration was sworn in 
on 3 January 2001 after having signed agreements with a number of 
opposition parties12. 
  
           
II. Determinant Indicators of Government Instability 
 
a. Duration of government 
 
In the literature on comparative government’s stability it is a much-
contested notion (most of the authors using duration as meaningful 
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‘proxy’ for stability13). This indicator of existence of a political 
stability refers to the ability of each govern to pursuit the social and 
economic program reforms. We consider 4 years as a normal period 
of government (1461 days).  
However, in a new democracy, where government stability and 
effectively are still in question, the literature fall into three groups to explain 
the variation in government duration: features of parliamentary cabinet 
government (type of government, ideological composition of government, 
parliamentary support); institutional features (plurality, structure of 
parliament, executive power of the Head of State); party system features (the 
ideology of the relevant parties, the degree of polarization)14. More 
specifically, column three shows the difference in number of days in 
government. The intervals measured show the unequal number of days in 
government (from 491 days for Ciorbea Government up to 1489 days for 
Văcăroiu Government).  
 
Table 1 
Duration of governments in Romania 1992-2004 
 
Government  Period of governance Duration of government 
Nicolae Văcăroiu 13 December 1992-10 December 1996 1489 
Victor Ciorbea 11 December 1996-15 April 1998 491 
Radu Vasile 16 April 1998-13 December 1999 616 
Mugur Isărescu 14 December 1999-12 December 2000 366 
Adrian Năstase 13 December 2000-21 December 2004 1469 
 
Note: Duration is measured in days. The number in the last column (average 
duration) indicates the report between the effective and the normal period of 
government.  
 
There are five governments listed in Table 1, but only two 
governments provide a very high rating of political stability (Văcăroiu 
government-1489 days and Năstase government-1469 days). Ciorbea 
government and Isărescu government, for example, score lower than might be 
expected. This could reflect the problems governing central institutions. 
                                               
13Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman, Ian Budge, op. cit,, p. 77. 
14 Ibidem, p. 78. 
The also suggest that the reasons of termination of a government is 
the main dependent variable of interest. A close look to reasons for 
termination of a government shows that in only two of the cases elections are 
the reason for termination of a government in the mentioned period (Văcăroiu 
government and Năstase government account 40% of all cases).  
b. The second is the optimal report. The term “optimal report” is 
commonly used to express the report between the normal period 
of government and the effective period of government. This is an 
interrelated and determinant indicator for the institutionalization 
of a democratic legitimacy.  
As we already mentioned, we consider 4 years as a normal period of 
government (1461 days). In pursuit of this last issue the paper indicates that 
we establish government stability when this report tends to 1; but if the value 
of this repport tends to 0 we establish governmental instability15. The optimal 
report is a dichotomous variable which takes on a value of 0 under a 
governmental instability and a value of 1 when the period of governance 
takes place under political stability16. 
 
       Table 2 
1st   Period of governance (13 December 1992-10 December 1996) 
 
Government Period of governance Duration of government 
Average 
duration 
Nicolae Văcăroiu 13 December 1992-10 December 1996 1489 1,02 
 
According to table results, the level of government stability is vey 
high. In this respect, the Vacaroiu government appears to be almost a 
paradigmatic model of the transitional democracy. As indicated bellow, the 
average score for Văcăroiu government is significant higher that for the rest 
of the period.  
 
 
 
                                               
15 Răzvan Grecu, Instabilitatea guvernamentală în România postcomunistă in „Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review”, Volume I, no. 3/2001, p. 792.  
16 The lack of interest in political science literature to the government stability in post 
communist Romania is explained by the varying changes in the number and character of 
governments in most of the countries in the region Cristian Preda and Răzvan Grecu report 
similar scores with respect to governments in the mentioned period.  For  more see, Cristian 
Preda, Sorina Soare, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Bucureşti, Nemira, 
2008, p. 129; Răzvan Grecu, op. cit., p. 792). 
Table 3 
 2nd Period of governance (11 December 1996-12 December 2000) 
 
Government Period of governance Duration of government 
Average 
duration 
Victor Ciorbea 11 December 1996-15 April 1998 491 0,33 
Radu Vasile 16 April 1998-13 December 1999 616 0,42 
Mugur Isărescu 14 December 1999-12 December 2000 366 0,25 
 
Nevertheless, the November 1996 elections in Romania marked the 
democratic consolidation of the country since 1989. The lack of a clear 
majority in Parliament meant that every bill had to be negotiated. The 
analysis of optimal report data shows that there is indeed a high risk of 
government instability backsliding immediately after 1996. The numbers in 
the fourth column represent the average, minimum (Isărescu government) and 
maximum (Vasile government) for the period 1996-2000. The table also 
shows that very no substantial variation in numbers for the cabinets in the 
same period (from 0,25% up to 0,42%). However, the table shows that the 
results for the three cabinets are similar between 0,25% and 0,42%. Isărescu 
government has the lowest value of the period around 1999-2000. As already 
mentioned in this introduction, the scores are valuable for the analysis of the 
political instability.  
 
Table 4  
3rd Period of governance (12 December 2000-21 December 2004) 
 
Government Period of governance Duration of government 
Average 
duration 
Adrian Năstase 13 December 2000-21 December 2004 1469 1,01 
 
 The table shows that Năstase government has one of the highest score 
of the period (1,01%). The table also indicates that the average duration of 
Năstase government is quite similar with the average duration of Văcăroiu 
government.  
In conclusion, the two following particular hypothesis are related to 
political instability:  
1. Under a situation of crisis, political instability is to be expected; 
2. Political instability still may be predicted, given the following 
analysis: understanding the reasons behind frequently changes of 
government are important in any democratic context. The 
variations of the period of governance have a significant effect on 
the level of concentration of the government authority. 
 
 
